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Civil Society and the Global Market for Loyalties
Abstract
My purpose in this chapter is to suggest a particular mode of thinking about media and global civil
society: ways in which major groups that seek to mould opinion around the world interact with each other,
with states and corporations, with domestic regulatory systems and with international organisations and
structures. I start with an approach I developed in a book called Television, Ihe Public Sphere, and
National Identity (Price 1995) and expanded in Media and Sovereignty: The Global Information Revolution
and its Challenge to State Power (Price 2002). There I described the existence of a 'market for loyalties', in
which large-scale competitors for power, in a shuffle for allegiances, often use the regulation of
communications to organise a cartel of imagery and identity among themselves. In the retrospectively
simple state centred version of a market for loyalties, government is usually not only the mechanism that
allows the cartel to operate, but is often part of the cartel itself. Management of the market yields the mix
of ideas and narratives employed by a dominant group or coalition to maintain power. For fulfilling that
process - or attempting to do so - control over participation in the market has been, for many countries, a
condition of political stability.
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CHAPTER 3
CIVIL SOCIETY AND THE GLOBAL MARKET FOR LOYALTIES
._',,

Monroe E Price

Introduction
My purpose in this chapter is to suggest a particular
mode of thinking about media and global civil society:
ways in which major groups that seek to mould
opinion around the world interact with each other,
with states and corporations, with domestic
regulatory systems and with international
organisations and structures. I start with an approach
I developed in a book called Television, Ihe Public
Sphere, and National Identily (Price 19951 and
expanded in Media and Sovereignly: The Global
Informalion Revolulion and ils Challenge 10 Steie Power

(Price 20021. There I described the existence of a
'market for loyalties', in which large-scale
competitors for power, in a shuffle for allegiances,
often use the regulation of communications to

organise a cartel of imagery and identity among
themselves. In the retrospectively simple statecentred version of a market for loyalties, government

is usually not only the mechanism that allows the
cartel to operate, but is often part of the cartel itself
Management of the market yields the mixof ideas and
narratives employed by a dominant group or coalition
to maintain power. For fulfilling that process - or
attempting to do so - control over participation in the
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market has been, for many countries, a condition of

political stability.
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Some version of this market, I contended, has
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existed everywhere and at all times. What differs in
todays market is the range of participants, the scope
of boundaries of relevant markets and the limitations
on the regulatory bodies capable of establishing and
enforcing rules for participation and exclusion. The
question for this chapter is how to define a global
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version of such a market and the role of civil society
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global: the changing nature of communications
technology and practice. Transformation in
communications technologies has always had
implications for orqanlsatior al strategies in the sale

and consumption of goods, in the political process and
finally in the large-scale formation of public attitudes.
Changes in strategy are intensified when technology
shifts are combined with large political upheavals,
altered demographies and changed concepts of law.
Satellites, the Internet and other methods of
exploiting new production and distribution
technologies are exactly the phenomena that
undermine old cartels and are the predicate for
forming new ones. Brands become global, films are
conceived in a worldwide, market, banks become
massive and transnational, religions think of multistate markets, nations see themselves in global
competition for hearts and minds and even museums

think widely across boundaries. Many groups - the
International Committee to Ban Landmines and Falun
Gong are examples that demonstrate the wide
spectrum - increasingly have a global focus because
they realise that a widely distributed consensus,
among elites or among broader segments of society,
is often essential for' their growth and success.

All these actors in the global theatre, ifthey wish to
deepen _or expand allegiances, must determine how
best to gain access to markets and how to have

sufficient entry to exploitthe shifts in communications
technologies and policies that are taking place. Media
globalisation and the accompanying growth of new
information technologies shake up access to the

political cartel byeroding existing barriers to entry. At
the same time, these changes can yield a crisis of

messages can reach target audiences and have a
competitive. edge.

domestic law and policy, especially ifthe new entrants
(or entrants who have been long repressed] present
threats to control, stability, territorial integrity and
national identity.
In this construct of a market for loyalties, the
'sellers' are all those for whom myths and dreams

Behind all this lies a significant factor that enables
civil society to be 'global', indeed, may force it to be

and history can somehow be convected into power and
wealth - classically, states, governments, interest

players within it. Put differently, one may ask how a
new array of global voices and forces seeks to arrange
or manipulate law and technology so that their

groups, businesses and others. Increasingly and

especially as the platform expands to the global, these
include organised elements of civil society transnational groups that exist outside the boundaries
of a state but use new marketing mechanisms to
enter existing but restricted domestic markets.
Organisations of various political and ideological
stripes fit into this definition. Environmental and
humanitarian organisations, supporters and
opponents of gun control, advocates of particular
religions or ideologies, foundations committed to
shifts in the availability and circulation of medicines:
all these and more seek to extend their global reach
and to transcend existing legal and technological
restraints that limit their ability to reach potential
audiences. These groups compete not only with
traditional domestic sellers, such as political parties,
but also with other experienced and talented
purveyors of loyalties, including the civil society and
interest groups already mentioned, as well as
companies that, through traditional advertising and
more subtle forms of persuasion, seek to reinforce
the rising tide of commercialisation and consumption.
The 'buyers' are the citizens, subjects, nationals and
consumers - recipients of the packages of
Information, propaganda, advertisements, drama and
news propounded by the media. The consumer pays
lor one set of identities or another in several ways,
including with their attention [an increasingly valuable
commodity] and with other modes that are attributes
of loyalty or citizenship. Payment, however, is not
expressed in the ordinary coin of the realm: it includes

not only compliance with tax obligations, but also
obedience to laws, readiness to fight in the armed
services, intensity of dedication to a particular cause
and even continued residence within the country.
Buyers also pay with their own sense of identity (Price

1994, 667-701. In a qlobalised world these buyers are
still often locked within a specific state, even as their
available group of suppliers are transnational [and
increasingly, as the power to produce and impart
information is democratised, buyers also have roles

as sellers].

Prising open the state-centered market
It is easiest to understand the functioning of such a
market for loyalties in the traditional context of a
single state. One can make the general claim that
much domestic broadcast regulation is an effort in a
society to maintain or adjust the distribution of power
among those who are dominant, with due recognition
for subsidiary groups. In a state, re-regulation, or the
incentive to change media law and policy. occurs
when the cartel of political allegiances can no longer
maintain its position of civil dominance. This may
seem like a churlish description, especially of
societies that pride themselves on free and open
markets - the liberal ideal of a marketplace of ideas.
But even in such societies, the process of opening and
closing reflects ideas of dominance.
A contemporary example of this phenomenon is the

slow rate of diffusion in the US of Al-Jazeera English
[the counterpart to the original Al-Jazeera channel],

which was launched in November 2006. Although the

be aired. In a 1973 decision, however, the Supreme
Court upheld CBS, ruling that an American
broadcaster was not a 'common carrier' that hadto
accept messages that were the equivalent of paid
editorial advertisements [Columbia Broadcasting
System v. Democratic National Committee 19731. This
decision maintained an institutional status quo that
limited entry, and characterised an era of scarce

channels and tight gatekeepers - a model that has far
from disappeared.
Because -every state provides a different, almost

idiosyncratic model of the market for loyalties and
different rules of access for new entrants, a
comparativestudy is usefuL. Some countries, in their

broadcaster is, strictly speaking, not a civil society
organisation, it is a platform for those, including civil
society players, who seek to influence political
attitudes and shape public opinion. In the US AlJazeera English has encountered enormous difficulty
in being carried by cable providers, and is currently
only available through satellite TV and the Internet. In
Canada, the 2004 Canadian Radio-television and
Telecommunications Commission [CRTC) ruling that
approved the Carriage of the Arabic-language AlJazeera p.aced onerous and exceptional conditions on
the privilege of cable television systems to carry it
[CRTC 20041. A market for loyalties analysis would ask
what formal and informal efforts restricted pathways
open to such a channel.
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An older example dealing with a domestic seller in
the market of loyalties and the question of access to
mainstream television channels, is also suggestive. In
1970, the civil society organisation. Business
Executives' Move for Vietnam Peace, complained to

baseline approaches, have had highly organised
plural approaches. The Netherlands and Lebanon are
examples. In the Netherlands, a complex but
aesthetically fascinating system built on pillarisation
in society, including separate, publicly financed
schools for those of different religious commitments.
Radio, then television followed with separate
producing organisations and public allocations oftime
for specific religious and social entities [Catholic,
Protestant, social democratic and others], Shares of
time on channels were allocated according to a

complex formula and many were quite explicitly
excluded. Belgium has a similar system.
In Lebanon, chaos and relatively free entry into the
media sphere, characteristic of the civil war period,

ended with a pacted agreement that allocated
television channels [and the principal political offices
in the land] on the basis of 'confessions or plural
powerqroupinqs [MaroniteChristian, Sunni and Shiite
Muslirnl that still persists. Totalitarian societies have
exercised near monopolies in the market for loyalties

with calibrated modes of barring entry for any

>w

the Federal Communications Commission [FCC] that
the broadcaster CBS had refused it the right to buy

:>:

time to broadcast spot announcements expressing

competing voice.
In states with a significant and autonomous public
service broadcaster, the nature of-access for

the group's views on Vietnam. The FCC ruled that a
broadcaster was free to refuse all 'issue' advertising.

service broadcasters have been more likely to seek

An intermediate court reversed this decision, saying
that '3 flat ban on paid public issue announcements is

out the viewpoints of civil society groups [though as
monopolies, and because of their historic relationship

in violation of the First Amendment, at least when
other sorts of paid announcements are accepted'
• [Columbia Broadcasting System v. Democratic
National Committee 19731. The court remanded the
cai.ses to the FCC to develop regulations governing
which, and how many, editorial advertisements could

to national power structures and their political
sensitivities, they are hardly providing open access, or
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elements of civil society has been different. Public

access available to all], In some states, public service
broadcasting has sought a structured voice -for civil

society

groups, ·sometimes

through

quota

representation on the staff or in programming, and

sometimes,:through representation on a governing
board, both forms of political pluralism.
Because of these and other differences, variously
constructed markets for loyalties have offered more or
fewer opportunities for elements of civilsociety to enter
and compete. Dominant players are always interested in
preserviJ)g their share in the allegiances of audiences
and citizens. Even where, as in the Netherlands, the
voices heard and positions represented were finely
calibrated and broadly inclusive, limitations and
exclusions existed. A pillarised society that organised
schools, media and other public goods along plural
lines had to have a method for determining which
entities would have entitlements and which would not.
Rulesand structures always provided a barrier to entry
(see Humphries 19961. And these barriers have a
tendency to collapse when, as in the case of the
Netherlands, technologies of transmission made a
mockery of restrictions. It is stating the obvious to note
that where forces of preservation are in conflict with
forces of transformation:
potential changes in power and control over the
established electronic media - either as a result
of new media or as a result of changes in the world
surrounding the media - do lead to initiatives in
favour of keeping the old pattern as well,as to
initiatives in favour of new patterns of power
and control. (McOuail and Siune 1986: 161

Finding new ways to engage audiences
When we shift from a focus on the state to the
transnational, the question of how civil society
engages with domestic and international systems
emerges more clearly. We must ask how access to
previously excluded spaces is achieved by global civil
society organisations and movements. Specifically,
what do these groups do, in fact, to break cartels or
otherwise increase their capacity to be effective, and
how do states and cartels respond? Put differently,
how do such groups invoke laws (even if not authoring
theml, deploy useful new technologies (even if not
controlling them) and muster force (even if it is
outside their direct capacity)?
It is relevant that the market for allegiances is not a
zero sum game. The buyer can absorb many loyalties
with differing intensities. He or she can be loyal to the
King, increasingly believe in democratic values, be a

devout Muslim, wear blue jeans and love consumer
culture. The issue here is not how the messages are
received and gain adherence, but rather what steps
are taken 50 that audiences have access. Guobin Yang,
using Margaret Keck and Kathryn Sikkinks analysis
(Keck and Sikkink 19981. argues, 'in information
politics, advocacy networks generate politically usable
information and move it to where it will have the most
impact' [Yang 20061. It IS that effort to shift and achieve
platforms for usable information that is the essence of
the growth at the global level of this competition by
civil society organisations.
In a gLobalised media worLd, efforts to gain access
intensify as competition emerges among those who
suppLy different ideologies or ideas. such as
environmental groups and contrarily-minded
industrial interests, or groups that have competing
notions of economic justice, religious beliefs
(Huntington 19931 or the use of small weapons [see
Bob In Chapter lOaf this volumel. From a perspective
of control over competing ideologies, the rush for
various states to have a satellite channel presence is
evidence of this competition.

Laws are made at the national level. but norms and
pressures increasingLy come from the global. Tacit or

states, or between
corporations or nonnisations (NGOs) may be designed
of a global market in cultural and
facilitate the ,predominance of
ideoloqy Over another. Thus, while the apparent
determinant of the relationship between regulation
and.control remains the nation state, communication
avenuesin'anyqiven state are increasingly a matter of
internatinnal-action or pressure, justified under the
aegis,forexample, of stability, trade or human rights.
Historically, rules', practices and other decisions,
both legitimate and arbitrary, and often arguments
based on scarcity, have blocked avenues for certain
civil society groups [both homegrown and foreignl in
specific markets for loyalties. Inparticular,access by
controversial civil society groups to platforms
presented by traditional media has often been made
difficult, if not impossible, Important advocates in
global civil society will often hold views that are
unpopular in the tarqet society they are trying to
penetrate. Those in authority will (and in some
instances should] characterise those views as
undermining national security or identity, as opposed
to longstanding and significant cultural norms, and as
inconsistent with the views of dominant economic and
political actors. Indeed, the very motive for organising
transnationally may be to alter attitudes among
specific publics. Transnational sellers, linked to
minority local counterparts, often argue for ethical
and legal outcomes that deserve to be heard but are
out of sync with prevailing mores. In this context,
global strategies can offer what Keck and Sikkink
describe as a 'boomerang effect,' allowing groups to
circumvent domestic indifference or pressure by
transferring debate to the international level [Keck
and Sikkink 1998: 12; Della Porta and Tarrow 20041.
Positing this kind of restricted market and suggesting
these limitations on some players only raises the
questions of what techniques are available to civil
society groups that wish to expand their capacity to
reach audiences globally: what they do, in fact, to
break cartels or otherwise increase their capacity to
be effective.
The point of this chapter is to describe the way such
a shift from a state-centered to a transnational
market for loyalties serves to reduce these limitations
or alter the theatre in which limitations operate. Of
course, this is just a shift: there have always been

transnational efforts to affect the structure of the
market. As Margaret Blanchard notes, the 'free-press
crusade' during the Second World War sought to
export the American ideal of freedom of the press:

Ifjournalists couldonlymanage to export the
blessings that the American free-press system
brought to the United States, then, indeed, the world
would be assured of democracy and peace.
(Blanchard 1986: 1)

More recent, transnational 'neutral' intermediaries
include Article 19, Reporters sans frontiers and the
Global Internet Policy Initiative. International media
development efforts frequently focus on developing
the infrastructure - including technical capacity such
as computers, websites and transmitters, as well as
business structure - that will allow entry by global
civil society and the increased dissemination of
content. These efforts often rely on government
funding for such work (Price et al. 20021.
As civil society groups think more and more about
how globalisation affects their speech-related needs,
they support changes in the infrastructure of
communications that permit greater ease of multisite access. Intermediaries begin to foster and
advocate, often under neutral auspices, policy
structures that permit global advocates to be more
effective in achieving their goals. Obviously, the new.
sellers favour a multichannel universe, one that
expands the numbers of platforms locally because of
altered technologies (such as satellite to home and
satellite to cablel. Overtime, and accelerating with the
arrival of satellite broadcasting, new technologies
empower transnational sellers in the market for
loyalties to reach domestic buyers. The globalisation
of the media alters the locus and operation of the
market for loyalties. Openness is expanded: old
vehicles become more attuned to the opportunities
available to the transnationalised civil society players
and new vehicles are created to deliver a broader
message. From a Western standpoint, the expansion
of the BBC World Service, the support of BBC Online,
the entry of France 24 and new uses of digital public
broadcasting channels in Europe and globally are
examples of such new entrants as vehicles for
delivery. But channels to reachdiasporic communities
in Europe count here as well. These vehicles
complicate the task of domestic gatekeepers and

challenge government controls on the gatekeeper.
Entities outside the state, such as multinational

corporations, other states and identity-related
groups, also participate in the market for loyalties
when they advocate the use of technology or the

adoption of international norms that would facilitate
or require the expansion of members in the cartel of
ideological or identity presenters. An example of this
is the Kurdish diaspore's efforts to pressure Turkey
for increased respect for human rights and the
protection of minorities through the EU as a condition
of its accession the EU (Eccarious-Kelly 2002;
European Commission 2005).

Pressures for unimpeded access
Civil society groups see themselves as committed -to
liberalising access and expanding the number of
players in the market for loyalties. Except in specific
instances lhate speech' is discussed belowl. they do

not perceive the need for a legal framework in which
they can help to exclude competitors, For that reason
(among others) an important technique for breaking
cartels of sellers in the market for loyalties and
allowing space for new voices comes through
pressure for the strengthening of international free
speech norms, such as the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights' Article 19. Civil society groups benefit

from a global infrastructure that allows broader, less
impeded dissemination of their messages, and

access to important domestic platforms.
Without question, implanting free speech norms

global CIvil society advocates who hope for legal

frameworks that would be more sanguine for their
capacity to persuade.

But reliance on law is cumbersome. Legal norms
must set clear and enforceable limits on the
restrictive actions of gatekeepers and enforceability
must be effective. Devices in which civil society
players have unmediated access have more appeal to
these new entrants than does reliance on law The use
of direct mail efforts (in societies where mail is an
inexpensive and unman itored form of message

benefits a new cohort or those who have learned to

delivery] IS an example. And In the Internet world the

take advantage of the altered legal and technological

capacity to establish a website, to enter chat rooms
and to develop a presence on newlycreated platforms,

circumstances, as well as citizens promising (and
perhaps delivering] access to a variety of information
sources that constitutes enhancing the 'right to

receive'. By the same token, such norms provide
opportunities for those disparate, dissenting and

plural points of view from outside to have clearer
opportunities to influence opinion (the 'right to
impart].' As part of this, global civil society groups
promote a legal regime that compels the opening of
media systems. Put simply, they do so on the proper
belief that a more open system makes their voice
more likely to be heard (Blanchard 1986]. Take the
global campaign of the great, prototypically global,
civil society organisation, Article 19 [established to
advance the Article of the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights). Article 19's campaign is supported by

provides another method of relatively (in many

societies and, at least, for the moment] unmediated
access. The increased number of satellite channels
serves to expand opportunities, but the capacity of
cable operators to select [where signals are so
redistributed) means that there are gatekeepers who
can pick and choose partly based on message
In their relentless search for unmediated modes of
delivering information and persuading audiences,
global civil society builds new and powerful platforms
to disseminate its messages. Woodstock was an early
emblem of this mode, which was linked to global Civil
society by Sir Bob Geldo! and Live Aid land continued

with Live 81. The event itself can become a medium; its
link to celebrity is the means of circumventing the

normal obstacles to entry. The notoriety of the event
becomes an argument, often compelling, for the
message [embodied in the eventl to be transmitted
through traditional media outlets. Alternate mode? of
distribution, ·such as documentary film .festivals, are

another part of the armament for civil society groups
seeking to more effectively enter the global market for
loyalties. Here the work of Sundance Film Festival and
the Sundance Institute in highlighting films that
address global social issues should be noted.

Hijacking platforms and piggy-backing
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In addition to creating new platforms, global civil
society can appropriate existing platforms [the larger
the platform, the more appealing] and turn the
message from that of its sponsors to those of the
qlobal civil society groups. Daniel Dayan, co-author
with Elihu Katzof Media Events (Dayan and Katz 19921.
has called this a 'hijacking' of a platform. The 1999
World Ministerial Conference of the World Trade
Organization was the hallmark recent ev,ent,
exemplifying at least a piggy-backing on a platform
created for one- general narrative to convey yet
another Embedded in this idea are a variety of
notions: that plettorrns (or certain platforms] provide

z

opportunities for exposure, that there is some
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accepted narrative [even if this is illusionary] that is
being crowded out or violated, and that it is possible to
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tell, sometimes in advance of the event, who the

The Olympic Games, and in particular the 2008

Olympics, are an important example of this
phenomenon, offering opportunities for alliances
among disparate groups that make up global civil
society to alter allegionces. China is using the Games
to influence public opinion at home and abroad; at the
same time, environmental and human rights groups,

both inside China and internationally, are using the
occasion to alter this official representation [and, as a
result, policies in ChinaI.
The Olympics offers opportunities to raise' the
profile of human rights and other groups concerned
with China. With the raised profile come new
opportunities to bring leverage to bear - Olympic
boycotts at one extreme. Because of the platform, the
Games provide an opportunity to characterise, to
create representations and to alter the pressure

points of global public opinion and the global public
sphere (see Box 5.1 in Chapter 5 of this volumel. One
dramatic example of this was an effort to 'shame'
China into altering its UN Security Council position on
UN troops for Darfur by raising the specter of
labelling 2008 the 'Genocide Olympics'. A powerful
Open Letter by Eric Reeves, a professor at Smith
College and Sudan activist, set the tone: .

it's time, now, to begin shaming China - demanding
that if the Beijing govemment is going to host the
premierinternational event, the Summer Olympic
Games of 2008, they musl be responsible international
partners. China's slogan for these Olympic Games 'One world, one dream'- IS a ghastlyirony, given

Beijing's complicityin the Darfur genocide (see the
website for China's hostingof the Olympic Games at
http://WNW.olympic.org/uk/games/beijing/index_uk.aspl.
The Chinese leadership must understand that if they
refuse to use their unrivaledpolitical,- economic, and

diplomatic leverage with Khartoum to secureaccess
for the terce authorizedunder UN SecurityCouncil
Resolution 1706, then theywill face an extremely

vigorous. unrelenting, and omnipresent campaign-to
shame them over this refusal. [Reeves 2007J
HOllywood soon joined the pressure campaign, After
urging from Mia Farrow, Steven Spielberg, who is
serving an artistic advisor for the Games, wrote a
letter to President Hu Jintao in April, urging him to
use China's influence constructively. The following
week there was some movement in China's policy,
with a Chinese official visiting Sudan to press the
government to accept a UN peacekeeping force
[Cooper 2007].

Such versatility and experimentation become
necessary qualities for global civil society as it copes

with media transformations. To innovate effectively
and circumvent existing barriers to .entry in the
market for loyalties, global civil society must
creatively use new communications technologies,as
well as heritage technologies. Audio-cassettes
provided a means of entry for unpopular ideas to an
otherwise closed market in Iran. An analysis by Ian
Liston-Smith for BBC Monitoring [Liston-Smith 2006J
addresses modes by which, in Africa, the introduction
of mobile phone networks suggested new possibilities

for receiving news unavailabte via local media and

the French regulatory agency, the CSA, determined
that AI-Manar, the Lebanese Hizbollah satellite

helping coordinate activism by human rights and

channel, should not be transmitted into Europe on

social justice organisations. SW Radio Africa

Eutelsat (on the grounds that its programming was
anti-Semiticl. the EU orchestrated an elaborate

employed mobile phone text messaging to overcome
the blockage .of news by the government of
Zimbabwe; a station operated by a London-based
group of Zimbabwean exiles was routinely jammed by
the Zimbabwean authorities but they circumvented
the barrier by text service. NGOs also used mobile
phones more frequently for delivery of information.

Creating new barriers
Still there are cartels and efforts to limit those who
can enter the market. Especially in Europe,
governments are establishing rules that govern what
channels, suspected of conveying hate speech, can be
carried by European-based satellite providers. After

system of cooperation to decide who would have
Jurisdiction to exclude channels (EUROPA 20051.

New technologies are also sites for the exercise of
state efforts to exclude various proponents in the
global civil society arena. Satellite receiver dishes are
prohibited or limited in many states because of the
government's inability to control what information
transmitted over them comes into the society. For
similar reasons, the Internet becomes a site for
surveillance and a target of sophisticated blocking or

filtering manoeuvres.
Few modern and democratic governments or policy
makers would articulate a policy of regulatory reform

saying explicitly that it was designed to keep them and
their cohort in power. in contrast, an authoritarian
society with a monopoly on information might have
less difficulty marrying rhetoric to reality. Threats to
the monopoly must be defeated; making that explicit
may be part of the ideology of control. In 2000,
Ayatollah Ali Khamenei ordered Iran's reformist
parliament to abandon its effort to change the
country's restrictive press laws, stating:

If the enemies infiltrate the press, this will be a big

danger to the country's securityand the people's
religious beliefs... I do not deem it rightto keep silent
... The bill is not legitimate and not in the interest of
the system and the revolution. [Abdo 2000J
While some states diligently and pervasively seek
techniques to limit entry, partly to keep global civil
society organisations at bay, not all states have the
resources and organised intelligence to do this. One

example is 'failed states' that lose control over their
media space - and their ability to resist external views
- as force is exerted against them. This is the case in
Afghanistan and Iraq, where the US has used specially
equipped military transport plans [Commando SoloJ
for radio and TV broadcasts [Allen 2003].

Conclusion
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It is hardly the case that all developments in the
globalising of the media are in the service. of civil
society. The impulse to allow new entrants into the
cartel and to encourage a media that reflects an
expanded set of suppliers in the market for loyalties is
matched by an impulse to prevent destabilisation.
Furthermore, powerful traditional players - states
themselves, religious qroups, elements concerned
with economic issues - strikingly seek to control entry
into the market for loyalties [sometimes seeking to
enter, sometimes seeking to block the entry of others].
One result is the domestication of the global
broadcasting entities. States may prefer certain global
suppliers of news and information because they may
be less threatening than homegrown opposition
channels. Theodor Adorno and Max Horkheimer
[1972J long ago pointed to the political impact of
assembly-line, standardised entertainment, arts and
education. They recognised that a vast industrialised
culture. industry could benefit a ruling class by
separating the rnasses from critical perspectives and

socialist ideas. Commercialisation may. undermine
historic cultures. but it is less subversive and, in the
short run,less destabilising and therefore more
appealing than a market in which civil society
messages are effective. A media space filled with
commercials is thus often preferable, from the
perspective of the status quo, to one crowded with
opposing alternate identities, such as stations of
Islamic fundamentalists in Egypt, Basque separatists
in Spain, or Kurdish nationalists in Turkey. In this
sense, in some circumstances, it can benefit the
government to allow the gestation and entry of
attractive commercial supply material, as the
powerful influences exerted by this material may
make it more difficult for competing national
identities to emerge. In a similar vein, the measured
inclusion of transnational civil society actors provides
an image of openness and progress, and is not
necessarily destabilising.
The world is engaged in a vast re-mapping of the
relationship of the state to images, messages, and
information within its boundaries. National
governments, international agencies, multinational
corporations, human rights organisations and
individuals are involved in this process. All is under
construction, yielding a thorough shaking and
remodelling of communications systems. Global civil
society, along with other actors, tests new and
modified techniques aimed at shaping and regulating,
if not mastering, the market for speech and
allegiances while using or responding to forces that
seem to undercuttraditional patterns of sovereignty.
As imagery becomes a supplement to or substitute
for force, the way media structures are shaped
becomes a matter of multilateral and international
concern. Globalcivilsociety has a stake in the ease of
reception of messages around the world: this is why
international speech norms are so much a part of
their agendas. Pressure to affect public opinion
regardless of boundary has always been a
preoccupation of those holding or seekinq power
[Fejes 1986; Nordenstreng and Schiller T993; Fisher
1987; Frederick 19861. In these ways, the international
media environment in which global civil society must
act is an increasingly interdependent site for the
development and application of formal and informal
rules that shape common narratives. In this space
Ideologies compete and groups forge allegiances that
ultimately help shape public opinion and determine

the course and very persistence of governments'and
nations themselves. Those involved in the competition
for power and particular outcomes learn to exploit the

interplay between conflict, instabilityand ideology.
In all of this, there is a shift away from the singularly
inward forms of state control to outward-looking,
regional ~r multilateral approaches, and awayfrom law
and regulation toward negotiation and agreement. The
tentacles of influence by one state over the media of
another are hardly new, but the process of interaction

through treaty or agreement on the flow of ideas,
information and sheer data, is everyday intensifying. In
times of conflict, bombs now supplement more
traditional forms of propaganda and new modes of
surveillance are enabled by sophisticated software.
How states respond to the new media environment

influences the profile and the capacities of global civil
society. At the same time, state response is in some

part a function of the actions of global civil society. One
aspect of what makes civil society global is the
accumulated set of understandings and the taxonomy
of responsiveness to these roiling forces in media

production and distribution.

